PRM-11 OFFICIAL FILE INDEX

01 November 1971	Letter re improving the intelligence effort TO: DCI Helms FM: President Nixon Attached is Nixon's 05Nov71 letter on the Organization and Management of the US Foreign Intelligence Community		A
03 November 1975	Issues and Answers: Role and Functions of the Senior US Foreign Intelligence Officer Prepared by [ ]		B STAT
22 November 1976	Fundamental Community Issues TO: AD/DCI/IC FM: D/OPEI		C
09 December 1976	Discussion of Intelligence Community Organization and DCI Authority TO: See Distribution FM: EO/ICS		D
03 January 1977	Paper re reorganizing the Intelligence Community (no author mentioned on paper)		E
05 January 1977	Paper entitled, "Organization and Management of the Intelligence Community" (no author)		F
No Date	Hoskinson draft of PRM/NSC-11		G
No Date	"Problems" from ID re PRM-11 matters Submitted by [ ]		H STAT
03 February 1977	DIA Presentation (Protection of National Security Information) TO: ADCI FM: Hughes, DIA	#0516	I
07 February 1977	Presidential Review Memorandum 11 TO: D/DCI/IC FM: D/OPEI ICS 77-2118		J
07 February 1977	Allison Model for Separation of the DCI from the CIA Submitted by D/OPP	#0484	K
07 February 1977	Organizational Location of the NRO: An Assessment of Options Submitted by [ ]	#0473	L STAT
04 February 1977	ADCI Meeting with Secretary Brown		(1)
-- February 1977	Early (February) Thoughts on PRM-11 by [ ]		(2) STAT

10 February 1977	PRM 11 (Note from D/OPEI to Sayre Stevens, DDO & S&T) Attached are comments from Stevens and DDO	M
16 February 1977	Notes from D/OPEI to D/DCI/IC and others attaching the first draft of a revised PRM-11	N
17 February 1977	Redraft of PRM-11 and Comments TO: D/DCI/IC FM: D/OPEI ICS 77-2119	O
22 February 1977	* Intelligence Structure and Mission TO: See Distribution FM: President Carter	P

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25 February 1977	Input to OPEI Homework Relative to PRM/NSC-11 TO: [ ] FM: [ ]	Q

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| 28 February 1977 | Intelligence Community Deficiencies   #0673 TO: D/OPEI   FM: [   ] | R
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28 February 1977	Deficiencies that should be addressed in developing response to PRM/NSC-11 TO: D/OPEI FM: C/SD	S
28 February 1977	PRM-11 TO: D/OPEI FM: C/PAID	T
01 March 1977	Presidential Review Memorandum 11 TO: See Distribution FM: D/OPEI There are three attachments ICS 77-2122	U

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02 March 1977	Comments from various components re preparation of PRM-11 FM: [ ], ID #0713 FM: C/PAID #0715 FM: [ ] #0718 FM: D/OPP #0719 FM: D/OPBD #0725 FM: Leslie Dirks #0726 FM: [ ]	V
No Date	Suggested Draft Outline, PRM-11, Part 2 Submitted to D/OPEI by [ ]	W

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| 03 March 1977 | Note to [   ] and John McMahon from D/OPEI re PRM-11 | X
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03 March 1977	<u>Studies in Intelligence</u> Article TO: D/DCI/IC FM: D/OPEI		<u>Y</u>
03 March 1977	Attached excerpt from Congressional Record covering Rep. Dellums' bill for intelligence community control TO: D/OPEI FM: OLC	#0729	<u>Z</u>
			STAT

Early (Feb) thoughts on PRM-11 by FK

Key Issues and Principles

3. The DCI and his panel will have to work out explicitly what the key issues and principles are that drive a new look at organization. The following seem germane:

    a. To what degree and with what effect should concern about intelligence resource management govern Community organization?

    b. Where and against what should which intelligence dollars be traded off? Against other intelligence dollars? Military forces?

    c. How much does or should sensible management of intelligence resources derive from command authority, log rolling and negotiations, or "systems analysis?"

    d. To what extent should intelligence management combine resource control and "substantive" leadership, in the DCI, in the Director of Defense Intelligence, or elsewhere?

    e. Is strong DCI leadership consistent with or threatened by strong leadership from a single senior office over defense intelligence, whatever the scope of that office?

    f. Is this proposition valid? "The US needs and can have more centralized control over intelligence resources for efficiency, but must preserve

a broad diversity of analysis and estimative judgment
to handle uncertainty and to serve diverse customers."

g. Is this proposition valid? "There is no such
thing as national versus departmental versus tactical
intelligence. All intelligence can serve many needs
and customers at different levels. These distinctions
apply to who owns the intelligence operating assets
in question. The challenge is to place ownership in
the hands that will best serve the need in rational
balance with other needs."

Major Organizational Options

4. The following is a reasonable spectrum of organiza-
tional options that should be examined in responding to
PRM 11:

Status Quo Plus

Present arrangements plus some clarification of
the Executive Order on the DCI's budgetary role and
access to Department of Defense (DOD) program managers.
A significant variant might bring all DCI Community
functions under the D/DCI/IC. Another variant might
reintegrate all DCI Community functions back into
CIA, which would be the DCI's sole executive base for
both his unique functions (DDO, national intelligence,
some R&D) and his Community leadership. Basic questions:

° Can the DCI really be expected to

rationalize the management of a four billion

dollar NFIP when he owns only 20 percent of

it and must negotiate the shape of the rest?

° What management arrangements in DOD

intelligence are consistent with this

responsibility?

DCI-Dominated Community

This option would place NSA and [blank]   25X1

directly under the DCI. He would thereby become the

line manager of some 65 percent of the NFIP. The PRC

(CFI) would continue to operate a) to enable DCI

influence over the rest of the NFIP, and b) to give

DOD an active voice in the management of the DCI-owned

part of the NFIP. NFIB would continue to be the

medium of diversity in national intelligence analysis

and estimates. Basic questions:

° Where should the National Security Agency

(NSA) and the SCAs be split?

° Can Defense still supply manpower and

management support to NSA and the [blank]   25X1

25X1   [blank]

° Can the needs of Defense be met?

° What defense intelligence leadership would be required over its remaining portions of national and departmental intelligence?

Director General of Intelligence - Tsar

Some sort of White House overseer of all US intelligence, especially emphasizing resource management and performance review. No basic change in present organizations, DCI's Community role would disappear. The crucial question here would be the extent of this figure's executive powers: Should they be great with all intelligence money allocated initially to him and with command powers over the several agencies, or should they be more collegial, as are the DCI's now over most of the Community?

Fragmentation

Under this option, all technical forms of intelligence collection would be subordinated to the DOD because they primarily supply defense-related intelligence. The CIA's Clandestine Service would be subordinated to the Department of State, because it supplies primarily political and economic intelligence and to rationalize its relationship to US foreign policy.

CIA's DDI would become a national center for foreign intelligence analysis and net assessment subordinated directly to the Executive Office of the President. An NFIB-like function could be retained to pull together the judgments of departmentally based intelligence elements. Basic questions:

° Where would an overview of intelligence resource management be supplied? OMB? NSC?

° Could the national analytic center task collectors? Would it become less an intelligence analysis center and more a government think tank?

° Could State manage a clandestine service? Would it, or should it, shrink further in size?

° Would unchallenged DOD ownership of national technical collection assets alter the structure of these programs, say, toward more battlemanagement applications, or distort their intelligence output? What would be the effect on arms control verification functions?